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Introduction In human history countless phenomena have been (wrongly) at-
tributed to agents. For instance, now science believes there are no gods (agents)
of lightning, thunder and wind behind the associated phenomena.
In physics (assuming quantum decoherence) the universe is modelled as a
state space with a dynamical law that determines everything that happens
within it. This however, is incompatible with most notions of agency (cf. Baran-
diaran et al., 2009) which require actions: For an agent candidate to have actions
it must be able to “make something happen” as opposed to only “have things
happen to it”.
Here we ask which single sequences of partial observations may appear to
contain agency to a passive observer who has its own memory. For this we define
measures of apparent actions and apparent goal-directedness. Goal-directedness
is another feature commonly attributed to agents. We here ignore whatever
causes the appearances and the concept of individuality of agents.
Apparent actions We assume that a passive observer perceives a sequence S
of sensor values (s1, ..., sT ) with T ∈ N+. At each instance t of the sequence, the
observer has a memory or knowledge state mt which gives us a second sequence
M = (m1, ...,mT ). The memory state of the agent might contain models of the
observations or not. In the course of a sequence S there is an apparent action for
observerM if for r, t ∈ {1, ..., T} we have (sr,mr) = (st,mt) and (sr+1,mr+1) 6=
(st+1,mt+1).
The intuition is that, since the same observation sr = st at different times
r, t is followed by different observations and the observer’s states mr = mt do
not indicate / predict the difference, the observer suspects a hidden mechanism
causing the difference. We assume that the observer interprets all signs of hidden
mechanisms as (apparent) actions.
Using the empirical distribution pS,M (s
′, s,m) = 1T
∑T
t=0 δs′st+1δsstδmmt
(δxy is Kronecker’s delta) we can quantify the extent of apparent actions along
the sequences as the conditional entropy H(S′|S,M).
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Apparent goal-directedness Our observer attributes the complete sequence
S to be the result of an agent’s strategy. Note that even if there is no apparent
action along a subsequence this could be due to the agent trying to avoid de-
tection. The idea is that any directedness reveals itself as some pattern within
the sequence and any pattern in the sequence will increase the compressibility
of the sequence. So we here define apparent goal-directedness of the observed
sequence S as its compressibility. Using a common compression algorithm (e.g.
gzip) Z we can estimate compressibility as l(S)−Z(S) where l(S) is the binary
length of all the data in the observed sequence and Z(S) the binary length of
the compressed data. Note that an adversary’s goal-directedness can remain
undetected only if S is completely random.
Examples Requiring both apparent action and apparent goal-directedness
leads to the following classifications: 1.) A Brownian particle exhibits apparent
actions but very low apparent goal-directedness. 2.) A ball thrown through the
air exhibits no apparent actions ifmt = st−1 i.e. if memory contains the previous
observations. Together the st−1 and st are enough to get linear momentum and
position of the ball which together determine its trajectory. Apparent goal-
directedness is high as the equations of motion compress the flight path. 3.)
A thief trying to guess a safe combination exhibits apparent actions as every
time a new combination is tried out it starts in the same initial position. It also
exhibits some goal-directedness, as it never tries the same combination twice,
which is a pattern.
Conclusion The apparent notions identify agency in example systems and
take into account capabilities of the observer. To fool the observer a (visible)
adversary has to a) be predictable to the observer (no apparent action) or b)
rely on randomness (luck) to achieve its goal (no goal-directedness).
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